MONTHLY QUIZ: CONTACT SPORTS EXCEPTION: Plaintiff allegedly sustained injury when member of Springfield Stallions, an indoor football team, ran out of bounds, fell over a wall separating spectators from the playing field, and collided with plaintiff. Plaintiff contended that the accident was the result of the negligent acts and omissions of defendants who operated and possessed the arena. Defendants moved to dismiss on the grounds that, because football was a contact sport where violent collisions are inherent, cases such as Karas v. Strevell and Pfister v. Shusta require plaintiffs to plead a greater culpability than mere negligence. Query: Does the contact sports exception apply to spectators at an indoor football game? You be the judge. (Answer below).
IL SUPREME COURT: POLICY PROVISIONS EXCLUDING UNDERINSURED MOTORISTS COVERAGE TO VEHICLE OCCUPANTS ARE VOID AND UNENFORCEABLE UNDER ILLINOIS LAW: Two declaratory judgment actions presenting same issue - whether Illinois law permits insurers to issue motor vehicle liability policies that afford occupants uninsured motorist (UM) coverage but exclude underinsured (UIM) coverage - were consolidated for appeal. With regard to UM coverage, respective policy definitions of “insured person” and “insured” included vehicle occupants. However, with regard to UIM coverage, both policies purported to limit UIM coverage to the person to whom the policy was issued, or a family member. The definition of “insured person” in the UIM coverage for the first policy also omitted occupants of the car. Under Illinois law, motor vehicle liability policies must provide UM and UIM coverages to permissive “users” of covered vehicles, which the high court held to include both occupants and drivers. Further, Illinois Supreme Court held that Section 143a–2 of Illinois Insurance Code (215 ILCS 5/143a–2 (West 2002)) precluded insurers from defining insureds differently for purposes of UIM and UM coverage. The policies, therefore, contravened Illinois law and were void and unenforceable. Schultz v. Illinois Farmers Insurance, --- N.E.2d ---, 2010 WL 966206, (IL.S.Ct. Mar. 18, 2010)
PATHOLOGIST’S TESTIMONY CREATES AN ISSUE OF FACT AS TO WHETHER DRIVER WAS NEGLIGENT: Defendant, a 72 year-old car salesman, used his company car to visit a girlfriend in Decatur. While driving, defendant either "went to sleep" or “blacked out,” swerved over the centerline and caused an accident – which was found to be prima facie negligence. Despite reportedly not feeling well, defendant refused medical treatment following the accident and was later found dead at his home. Pathologist who performed autopsy opined that the loss of consciousness was due to a “Stokes Adams attack,” which was caused by a heart attack 7-10 days before the accident. Defendants contended that salesman’s loss of consciousness was an “unforeseeable and unpreventable” act-of-God, while Plaintiff maintained that salesman would have experienced pain following his heart attack, which he negligently ignored. In reversing trial court’s grant of summary judgment, 4th District held that, under the circumstances, a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether accident was a result of defendant’s negligence, or an “act of God.” Evans v. Brown, --- N.E.2d --- , 2010 WL 1206870, (4th Dist. Mar. 23, 2010)
ARBITRATION PANEL WITHOUT AUTHORITY TO AWARD ATTORNEYS’ FEES UNDER SECTION 155 OF ILLINOIS INSURANCE CODE: Arbitration panel award of attorneys’ fees under Section 155 of Illinois Insurance Code relating to a claim for insured’s vexatious and unreasonable failure to pay certain claims, was in error, as Insurance Code only authorizes a “court” to award attorneys’ fees under that section. Amerisure Mutual Insurance v. Global Reinsurance Corporation of America, --- N.E.2d --- , 2010 WL 960339 (1st Dist. Mar. 15, 2010)
ANSWER TO QUIZ: Plaintiff wins! The contact sports exception does not apply. Plaintiff’s status as a spectator, rather than a participant, makes cases like Karas, Pfister, in which the plaintiffs were participants in contact sports, fundamentally distinguishable. Pickel v. Springfield Stallions, et al. --- N.E.2d --- , 2010 WL 1205959, (4th Dist. Mar. 23, 2010)
